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Robust Non-Interactive Oblivious Transfer
Yi Mu , Member, IEEE, Junqi Zhang, Vijay Varadharajan, Senior Member, IEEE, and Yan-Xia Lin
Abstract—We present a novel scheme of noninteractive out of
oblivious transfer, which demonstrates significant improvement
over the existing schemes in terms of completeness, robustness and
flexibility. This scheme is useful for protection of user privacy in
the Internet.
Index Terms—Data security, oblivious transfer.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE concept of Oblivious Transfer (OT) was introducedby Rabin [1]. Rabin’s OT can be considered as a game
between two polynomial time parties, Alice and Bob. Alice
sends a bit to Bob in such a way that with 1/2 probability
Bob will receive the same bit and with 1/2 probability Bob
will receive nothing. Alice does not know which event has
happened. Rabin’s initiative has attracted a lot of attentions.
Various OT methods have been subsequently proposed (e.g.,
[2]–[7]), where most notable ones are one out of two OT and
chosen one out of two OT. In a one out of two OT (-OT),
Alice sends two bits to Bob who receives one of these bits with
equal probability and knows which bit he has received, while
Alice does not know which bit Bob received. A chosen one
out of two OT is similar to a normal one out of two OT; the
different between them is that, in the former, Bob can choose
an index and receives bit . Alice does not learn.
One direct extension to -OT is 1 out of oblivious transfer
[8], [9]. However, there has been little study inout of obliv-
ious transfer, -OT. The closest scheme is the out of
OT proposed by Bellare and Micali [10]. Roughly speaking, in
an out of oblivious transfer, Bob can receive only mes-
sages out of messages ( ) sent by Alice; and Alice has
no idea about which ones have been received. The OT proposed
by Bellare and Micali [10] is noninteractive. By noninteractive
we mean that Bob does not need to communicate with Alice
during an OT process. Santis and Persiano [8] also proposed a
noninteractive OT protocol. Their scheme falls within the case
of 1 out of .
In this paper, we go one step further by giving a new non-
interactive OT scheme that covers the complete OT spectrum.
We called them out of OT, -OT. Here, is an arbi-
trary number in . The original OT scheme by Rabin
can be considered as one of cases in our scheme. One important
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feature in our schemes is that the sender and the recipient can
securely implement an OT process without the involvement of
a trusted third party, because the security can be proved by both
the sender and the recipient.
II. SYSTEM SETUP
of oblivious transfer is defined as follows. Alice knows
messages and wants to sendof them to Bob. Bob gets
of them with probability and knows which ones
he has got, but Alice has no idea about whichmessages Bob
has received.
Assume that Alice intends to send messages,
, to Bob and knows for sure that Bob
can receive of them. Which ones will be received by Bob
is unknown to Alice. We now describe the Bob’s public key
generation algorithm that will be used to our -OTs.
Let be a large prime number, be a multiplicative group,
be the generator of order , and ,
, be a set of integers. All these data are pre-agreed
and made public. For simplicity, we omit modulusin the rest
of the presentation.
The public key setup is done by Bob who selectsprivate
keys and then computes , (
). Given , the public keys are constructed by using a set of
linear equations with respect to ,
(1)









Here . The coefficient matrix is a so-called Van-
dermonde matrix. The determinant ofis not equal to zero
i.e., is a nonsingular matrix, becauseBob chose are distinct
and no element ( ) in this product equals zero. Since the
determinant of the coefficient matrix is nonzero, the equations
have a unique solution over the field .
After Bob has got the unique solution , he can cal-
culate other “public keys” (their discrete logs are un-
known), using the following formula:
As a result, he has public keys .
Bob shuffles his public keys such that the order is known to
himself only. The shuffled public keys are then made public. For
1089-7798/03$17.00 © 2003 IEEE
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convenience, we denote by the subset of public key indices
whose associated public key discrete logs are unknown to Bob
and by those known. Since the pubic keys will always come
with a shuffled form, we still denote by the shuffled
public key set.
The public keys can be easily verified without knowing
the corresponding private keys. Given the public key set
, we can chooseany of public keys from the
public key set, and then calculate for with
respect to the public keys, where if the public keys
are genuine. With the resultant, we can verify the rest of
public keys,
Here, have not been used in computation of.
A. Claim 1
Given , Bob cannot cheat by pre-selecting.
The explanation is as follows. After Bob found the unique co-
efficient set , he can compute for in terms of
the given . However, it is infeasible for him to com-
pute the discrete logs of these values in poly-time. Bob should
not be able to cheat by pre-selecting and then try to
find that satisfies all equations. To fix this potential
problem, we give the following lemma.
Lemma 1: To prevent Bob from cheating by pre-selecting all






which is an matrix.
Proof: Consider equation:
... ...
Because the rank of is , by making row transformations,
we have a nonsingular matrix such that









Because is nonsingular, it implies that the equations with
respect to have no nonzero solution at all. In other words, Bob
cannot find a nonzero solution if he wants to cheat by precom-
puting .
Therefore, in the verification of public keys, we also need to
check if or not the rank of is equal to .
III. N ON-INTERACTIVE OUT OF OT
Using the setup phase given in Section II-A, Bob obtains his
private keys for and his public keys
where the discrete logs of for are not known. The
protocol is described as follows.
• Alice:
– randomly chooses ;
– calculates , ;
– generates the order of messages at random;
– based on the order, calculates for
;
– then sends to Bob and .
• Bob: decrypts to recover messages, ,
.
A. Claim 2
(Completeness) If Alice correctly follows the procedure, Bob
can recover out of messages, .
This is obvious. Note the facts that the order of the public
keys are not changed and Bob knows their indices. Bob has
private decryption keys , , and knows which ones to de-
crypt. The encryptions done by Alice are based on the standard
ElGamal encryption scheme. [11]
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B. Claim 3
(Soundness) Both Alice and Bob cannot cheat.
Alice does not know which public keys are associated with
Bob’s private keys, so she cannot know which messages Bob
can decrypt and has no control over which messages Bob will
receive. Bob cannot cheat by manipulating his public keys. This
is because Alice can check the correctness of Bob’s public key
using the method described earlier in this paper. The security is,
however, based on the assumption that our system is poly-time-
bounded. Bob cannot solve the discrete log problem in poly-
time.
C. Non-Malleable Encryption
In the scheme presented in the preceding section, Alice was
assumed to be honest in that she always uses Bob’s public keys
in encryption. The assumption is reasonable, since Alice wants
Bob to receive out of messages she sent. However, if the
order of the public keys or the order of the ciphertext is changed
by accident (or by an adversary) during the transmission, Bob
will not be able to find the fraud in the case that the messages
consist of unrecognizable strings. We now modify the scheme so
that he can check if or not the encrypted messages sent by Alice
are correctly constructed. We now construct a nonmalleable en-
cryption by reconstructing the private keys: select private keys,
, and some integers, , such that they satisfy
. It is not hard to find that we can selectand
that satisfy and . Bob needs to keep
and secret. His public keys are still the same. The correctness
of the encryptions can then be verified during the decryption.
Bob now decrypts the obliviously transferred messages using
two different methods: for message ,
Method 1: Compute and then remove .
Method 2: Compute .
Bob then checks the equality of two messages. The complete-
ness is straightforward. To prove the soundness, we assume that
Alice has not correctly used Bob’s public keys in her encryp-
tions, but uses . Bob can immediately find the fraud.
Method 1: Compute .
Remove from the message, Bob then gets
.
Method 2: Compute .
Obviously, they are not equal.
In conclusion, we have proposed a new non-interactive OT
protocol that is provably secure. Becausecan vary from 1 to
, our scheme covers the entire spectrum of noninteractive
OT. This new setting has potential applications for protection of
user privacy in the Internet.
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